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Abstract 
Background: Cryptomarkets are digital platforms that use anonymising software (e.g. Tor) 
and cryptocurrencies (e.g. Bitcoin) to facilitate trade of goods and services, most notably 
illicit drugs. Cryptomarkets may reduce systemic violence compared with in-person drug 
trading because no face-to-face contact is required and disputes can be resolved through a 
neutral third party. In this paper, we describe the purchasing behaviour of cryptomarket users 
and then compare the self-reported experiences of threats, violence and other drug-market 
concerns when obtaining drugs from cryptomarkets with obtaining drugs through friends, 
known dealers and strangers. 
Methods: The Global Drug Survey was completed in late 2014 by a self-selected sample who 
reported accessing drugs through cryptomarkets in the last 12 months (N=3,794).  
Results: Their median age was 22 years and 82% were male. The drug types most commonly 
obtained through cryptomarkets were MDMA/Ecstasy (55%), cannabis (43%) and LSD 
(35%). Cryptomarket users reported using a median of 2 sources in addition to cryptomarkets 
to access drugs, the most common being in-person friendships (74%), in-person dealers 
(57%) and open markets/strangers (26%). When asked to nominate the main source they 
would use if cryptomarkets were unavailable, 49% nominated friends, 34% known dealers 
and 4% strangers. ‘Threats to personal safety’ (3%) and ‘experiencing physical violence’ 
(1%) were less often reported when using cryptomarkets compared with sourcing through 
friends (14%; 6%), known dealers (24%; 10%) or strangers (35%; 15%). Concerns about 
drug impurities and law enforcement were reported more often when using the alternative 
source, while loss of money, waiting too long and not receiving the product were more often 
reported when using cryptomarkets.  
Conclusion:  Cryptomarkets are associated with substantially less threats and violence than 
alternative market types used by cryptomarket customers, even though a large majority of 
these alternatives were closed networks where violence should be relatively less common. 
 
Keywords: cryptomarkets; drug markets; dark web; violence; social supply; e-commerce 
Word count body = 4581 
Abstract = 299  
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Introduction 
Participants in markets for illegal goods and services are not afforded the usual protections of 
legal systems that govern fair business conduct. Contracts and agreements within criminal 
networks are deliberately ambiguous or absent, a result of actors’ attempts to evade 
prosecution, making dispute resolution even more difficult (Reuter, 2009). Given these 
conditions, violence (e.g. assault, homicide) may be utilised as a tool for resolving disputes 
between networks and within networks (Reuter, 2009), as well as for maintaining reputation, 
recovering losses and to enact vengeance (Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002). This kind of 
drug-related systemic violence was defined by Goldstein (1985) as the traditionally 
aggressive patterns of interaction within the system of drug distribution and use. In addition 
to drug market participants being barred from legal redress, these markets may be 
characterised by violence because full-time market participants typically come from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds, where they are more likely to have experienced violence as a 
normal dispute resolution strategy (Andreas & Wallman, 2009).  
It is not always the case that illegal markets involve systemic violence or that violence will be 
employed uniformly (Friman, 2009). Specific drug markets that have notorious reputations 
for violence are not experienced as violent by participants, for example, Australia’s 
Cabramatta heroin market as described by Coomber and Maher (2006). In more recent work, 
Coomber (2015) compared two heroin/crack markets located in different UK cities, finding 
that the extent of market violence was contingent on the local cultural circumstances, rather 
than predicted by systemic conditions. In fact, Pearson and Hobbs (2001) describe violence 
within drug trading as a sign of market dysfunction. They argue that if everything is working 
well, everyone is making a profit and no-one needs to resolve disputes with overt violence, 
which is likely to attract police attention or rival retaliation. As further evidence that violence 
signals a dysfunctional market, Werb et al. (2011) found that law enforcement efforts to 
disrupt markets exacerbated the problem of drug market violence by increasing instability 
within and between criminal networks.  
Open drug markets have been described as more susceptible to violence than closed markets 
(Harocopos & Hough, 2005; Reuter, 2009). Drug markets may be understood as falling on a 
continuum between more open or more closed: open markets are those that are “open to any 
buyer, with no requirement for prior introduction to the seller, and few barriers to access”, 
while closed markets are “ones in which sellers and buyers will only do business together if 
they know and trust each other, or if a third party vouches for them” (May & Hough, 2004, p. 
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550-1). In an open market, buyers and sellers cannot readily identify each other except at 
specific public locations, such as a corner or street known to the local community to be used 
for the purpose of drug trading. In this context, ‘turf wars’ may erupt where rival actors use 
violence to intimidate or remove potential challengers to operating in that locality. In 
contrast, closed markets occupy much less visible spaces, where transactions are conducted in 
private homes or in public spaces where individuals make prior arrangements to meet. Social 
supply, defined as the non-commercial (or non-profit-making) distribution of drugs to non-
strangers (Hough et al., 2003), tends to occur within closed market structures (Nicholas, 
2008; Taylor & Potter, 2013). Typically, the policing of open markets often transforms them 
into closed markets, because market participants are forced away from meeting in known 
public areas by the threat of law enforcement. In turn, closed markets are harder to police but 
are seen to be less disruptive to public amenities and less prone to systemic violence 
(Harocopos & Hough, 2005).  
The scholarship reviewed above indicates that the degree of openness of a market influences 
the character and extent of violence associated with that market. Therefore, if we are to assess 
and characterise violence associated with cryptomarkets, we need to characterise the degree 
of openness of cryptomarkets. According to Martin (2014), cryptomarkets are “online 
forum(s) where goods and services are exchanged between parties who use digital encryption 
to conceal their identities” (pp. 2-3), distinguishable from drug vendors operating in the 
‘clear’ or ‘surface’ web through their reliance on anonymising networks (e.g. Tor), third party 
hosting, vendor and buyer rating systems, decentralised exchange networks, and use of 
cryptocurrencies (e.g. Bitcoin).. The combined use of anonymising networks, 
cryptocurrencies and the encryption of communications between market participants results 
in a system that enables features of both open and closed markets: arguably, from the 
perspective of market participants, providing the ‘best of both worlds’. That is, cryptomarkets 
are neither open nor closed, but are rather a hybrid of each. Aldridge & Décary-Hétu (this 
volume) have suggested that the anonymity mechanisms of cryptomarkets allow any potential 
buyer to approach the marketplace, and characterise these markets as 'anonymous open' in 
this regard. 
The existing academic literature regarding cryptomarkets characterises them as an 
opportunity to reduce much of the violence associated with conventional in-person illicit drug 
distribution (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014; Buxton & Bingham, 2015; Martin, 2014; van 
Hout & Bingham, 2014). Cryptomarkets are associated with a reduced likelihood of violence 
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because a different set of skills is required of cryptomarket vendors to succeed (e.g., good 
customer service, writing skills) compared with conventional dealers who can utilise physical 
intimidation to maintain market share (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014). Cryptomarket 
vendors may, therefore, arise from a rather different population than street market dealers, 
who Andreas & Wallman (2009) describe as resorting to violence for dispute resolution due 
to violence being more normative and a lack of alternative options. Furthermore, 
cryptomarkets have unique features that reduce the likelihood of violence occurring: there is 
rarely any in-person contact between actors in the market, making physical violence difficult 
if not impossible to enact, and there is a dispute resolution system operated by the 
cryptomarket administrators that provides an independent governance structure (Aldridge & 
Décary-Hétu, 2014; Buxton & Bingham, 2015; Martin, 2014; van Hout & Bingham, 2014).  
Missing in these characterisations (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014; Buxton & Bingham, 
2015; Martin, 2014; van Hout & Bingham, 2014) is a full comparison between cryptomarkets 
and a variety of conventional market structures (Barratt, 2015). Instead, a dichotomous 
comparison is made between online and offline trading, or between cryptomarkets and 
‘street’ markets, without reference to social supply or to other structures ranging between 
fully open and fully closed market structures (but see Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, this volume, 
who also tease out these market structure differences). The omission of social supply from 
these analyses is all the more striking because user surveys (Barratt, Ferris, & Winstock, 
2014) and longitudinal measurement of multiple markets (Soska & Christin, 2015) indicate 
MDMA and cannabis are the most-often traded substances in cryptomarkets, and in these 
markets, ‘friends’ are most often nominated as the main source of supply (Belackova & 
Vaccaro, 2013; Jacinto, Duterte, Sales, & Murphy, 2008; Nicholas, 2008). Therefore, we ask 
to what extent does cryptomarket drug buying reduce experiences of drug market violence if 
the population using cryptomarkets would otherwise be sourcing from social supply 
networks, where such violence is relatively minimal?  
In this paper, we present data from a survey of cryptomarket drug buyers to address the 
following aims: 
1. To determine the common drug types obtained through cryptomarkets in a large 
sample, in order to validate the use of this sample against previous work (Barratt, et 
al., 2014; Soska & Christin, 2015). 
2. To determine the mix of drug market sources used by recent cryptomarket users and 
which of these sources is preferred should cryptomarkets no longer be available, 
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which is necessary to assess the potential reduction in violence by shifting one’s 
supply to cryptomarkets. 
3. To compare the extent that recent cryptomarket users have experienced a list of issues 
and concerns, including threats to personal safety and violence, in relation to both 
cryptomarkets and their preferred alternative source. 
Method 
Global Drug Survey annually designs and conducts anonymous, online surveys to investigate 
trends in illicit drug use. In collaboration with media partners (see acknowledgements), the 
survey is actively promoted via social networking sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Reddit 
for a period of 1 to 2 months from its launch in mid-November each year. The study received 
ethical approval from the Kings College London Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery 
Research Ethics Subcommittee (PNM RESC).  
Between 9 November 2014 and 3 January 2015, a total of 101,311 responses were submitted. 
After preparing the data, 3,456 records were excluded due to data capture glitches, duplicate 
entries, reporting no psychoactive drug use at all, and reporting the use of a fake drug. Of the 
remaining 97,855 respondents, 5,370 (5.5%) reported ever buying or arranging others to buy 
drugs from cryptomarkets while 91,318 (93.3%) reported never doing so, with 1.2% missing. 
Of the 5,370 respondents reporting some use of cryptomarkets, 3,794 (70.7%) reported 
obtaining drugs from cryptomarkets in the last 12 months (defined as ‘recent’ in this paper). 
These 3,794 recent cryptomarket users form the sample for analysis here. 
Measures were constructed based on previous surveys (Barratt, et al., 2014) and to address 
the research questions specified above. No validated measures were available for measuring 
cryptomarket use, so questions were constructed based on literature review of cryptomarket 
research and known concerns and issues associated with drug buying, gleaned from the first 
author’s digital ethnographic work within the original cryptomarket, Silk Road (Barratt, 
Maddox, Lenton, & Allen, this volume). The measures included in this paper covered 
demographic characteristics, drug use characteristics, use of cryptomarkets to obtain drugs, 
other drug sources used in the last 12 months, the preferred alternative drug source, and 
experiences of a list of issues and concerns arising from the use of cryptomarkets and their 
preferred drug source. Our definition of the use of cryptomarkets to obtain drugs included 
respondents who reported (a) personally purchasing drugs through cryptomarkets for their 
own consumption, (b) arranging for someone else to purchase drugs through cryptomarkets 
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for them, and/or (c) purchasing drugs through cryptomarkets on behalf of somebody else or 
with the intention to supply to somebody else. The complete questionnaire module can be 
accessed at http://www.globaldrugsurvey.com/GDS2015/survey_display_version.php? 
showsection=darknet  
Respondents were asked to what extent they had experienced a list of 20 issues (see Table 2) 
when they, or someone on their behalf, purchased drugs through cryptomarkets and through 
their nominated alternative drug source, using a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning ‘none of the 
time’ through to 10 meaning ‘all of the time’. Prior to analysis, experience ratings were 
dichotomised with any rating above 1 indicating at least some experience with the issue. 
Odds ratios were calculating by treating the unit of event as the response for either 
cryptomarkets or the alternative source. Treating cryptomarket responses as ‘cases’ and 
alternative source responses as ‘controls’, tests of difference were calculated using Stata’s cci 
command. Pearson’s χ2-tests were used to test differences between groups, using an alpha 
level of significance of 0.05. All percentages reported use the number of valid cases as their 
denominator. The percentage of missing values for all variables reported is available in the 
Supplementary Table. All analyses were conducted using Stata 14. 
Results 
Demographic characteristics 
Fifty-seven different countries of residence were represented. Six countries, Germany 
(21.6%), United Kingdom (18.3%), France (11.9%), United States (11.4%), Australia (6.3%) 
and the Netherlands (5.3%) made up three-quarters (74.8%) of the sample. The median age of 
the recent cryptomarket user sample was 22 years (Interquartile Range [IQR] 20–27). Most 
participants (82.3%) identified as male, with the remainder identifying as female (17.0%) or 
transgender (0.7%). Most identified their ethnicity as ‘White’ (91.5%). Over half (55.0%) 
reported that they were in paid employment, a third (35.0%) were students who were not in 
paid employment, and 7.3% were unemployed and looking for work (2.7% other). Most 
(84.8%) reported completion of secondary school, including 38.0% who reported completion 
of a university degree. More than half (59.3%) reported ‘going clubbing’ at least once a 
month, including 21.4% who reported clubbing weekly or more often.  
Obtaining drugs through cryptomarkets 
The median number of times that participants reported ever obtaining drugs through 
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cryptomarkets was 4 (IQR 2–10), including 17.6% who reported only doing so once and 
10.9% 20 or more times. The median length of time between first time and last time they 
obtained drugs through cryptomarkets was 7 months (IQR 1–18). The median number of 
cryptomarkets (for example, Silk Road, Evolution, Agora, etc.) that participants reported ever 
accessing drugs through was 2 (IQR 1–3). While 42.8% reported use of only one 
cryptomarket, 6.6% reported using 5 or more cryptomarkets. In the last 12 months, most of 
the sample reported obtaining drugs through cryptomarkets either ‘once or twice a year’ 
(46.5%) or ‘every few months’ (32.1%), with the remainder reporting ‘about once a month’ 
(14.7%) or ‘about once a fortnight’ or more often (6.7%). While the entire sample reported 
use of cryptomarkets to access drugs in the last 12 months, participants’ engagement with 
cryptomarkets differed. More than half (58.0%) reported personally purchasing drugs through 
a cryptomarket for their own consumption, including 25.4% who also reported buying drugs 
on behalf of somebody else or with the intention to supply to somebody else. A similar 
proportion (55.6%) reported arranging for someone else to purchase drugs through 
cryptomarkets on their behalf, including 39.3% who reported only accessing drugs through 
cryptomarkets in this way (that is, they did not buy the drugs themselves). Only 1.3% 
reported only buying drugs on cryptomarkets that were not for their own consumption.  
Table 1 shows the drug types participants reported using for non-medical purposes during 
their lifetime and in the last 12 months, alongside the drug types they reported ever obtaining 
through cryptomarkets. Participants were asked to report their use of 153 drugs or drug 
forms, with a selection of the most prominent displayed here. The drug most commonly 
obtained through cryptomarkets was MDMA/Ecstasy (54.6%), followed by cannabis (42.9%) 
and LSD (34.8%). Within this sample of recent cryptomarket users, two thirds (67.4%) of 
those who reported lifetime use of MDMA/Ecstasy reported obtaining it through 
cryptomarkets (the highest proportion across drug types). Other drug types that more than 
half of lifetime users reported obtaining through cryptomarkets included NBOMe drugs 
(59.4%), LSD (58.5%), DMT (55.4%) and 2C drugs (52.5%) (see Table 1 footnote for 
definitions). 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
Cryptomarkets in context with other drug sources 
Recent cryptomarket users reported using a median of 2 sources in addition to cryptomarkets 
to access drugs (excluding alcohol, tobacco, caffeine & prescription drugs prescribed by their 
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doctor) in the last 12 months (IQR 1–3). The median proportion of last-12-month drug 
consumption obtained through cryptomarkets was 23% (IQR 5–64%). Only 6.4% reported 
accessing drugs only through cryptomarkets during that period. The most commonly reported 
additional sources were in-person friendships (73.8%) and in-person known dealers (57.1%). 
The median proportion of last-12-month drug consumption was 19% (IQR 0–49%) for 
friends in-person and 9% (IQR 0–30) for dealers in-person. Other sources included open 
public markets (e.g. street, festival; 25.9%; labelled hereafter as ‘strangers’), shop fronts (e.g. 
adult stores, head shops, coffee shops, smoke shops, cannabis shops; 16.5%), made or grew 
their own (13.3%), the surface web (normal, not encrypted websites; 10.6%) (see volume 
editorial for definition), known online dealer (without the use of a cryptomarket; 6.6%), and 
other source not elsewhere specified (8.8%).  
Preferred alternative source to cryptomarkets 
Participants were asked which of these sources they would be most likely to use to replace 
cryptomarkets if they were no longer available. Most participants chose in-person friendships 
(49.3%) or in-person known dealers (34.0%), while 3.8% nominated open public 
markets/strangers, 3.4% would make or grow their own, and 3.0% would use known online 
dealers, 1.9% the surface web, 1.3% shop fronts, 0.9% other. Some 2.5% said they would not 
use another source if cryptomarkets were unavailable; that is, they would no longer access 
drugs. Among those who nominated an alternative source, the median number of times that 
they had ever obtained drugs through that source was 10 (IQR 3–51), including 13.3% who 
nominated an alternative source they had never used before and 20.0% who reported they had 
used this source over 100 times before. 
Comparing issues of concern between cryptomarkets and alternative source 
Participants who nominated an alternative drug source that they had used at least once before 
reported whether they had experienced a list of 20 issues when using (1) cryptomarkets and 
(2) their alternative source to obtain drugs. In Table 2, these issues are sorted from smallest to 
largest odds ratio, treating experiences with cryptomarkets as ‘cases’ and experiences with 
alternative drug sources as ‘controls’.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Respondents were at significantly increased odds of reporting threats to their personal safety 
when obtaining drugs through their alternative drug source, compared with obtaining drugs 
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through cryptomarkets (Inverse OR = 7.06 (5.33–9.46), p < .001). They were also at 
significantly increased odds of reporting experiencing physical violence when obtaining 
drugs through their alternative drug source (OR = 6.53 (4.24–10.45), p < .001). Respondents 
were also at significantly increased odds of reporting obtaining a low purity product, a 
product that does not contain the expected substance or a product of variable purity from their 
alternative drug source, compared with drugs obtained cryptomarkets. In addition to issues 
related to violence and drug content and purity, respondents were at significantly increased 
odds of reporting lower availability, paying more than a reasonable price, spending money 
they could not afford, being caught by law enforcement, being blackmailed, having their 
identity revealed, and experiencing health harms from use when obtaining drugs through their 
alternative source compared with cryptomarkets (see Table 2). There were also some other 
issues that respondents were at significantly increased odds of reporting when obtaining 
drugs through cryptomarkets compared with their alternative source. These issues included 
losing money due to volatile currency markets or market seizure/scam/theft, customs seizure 
of product, being asked to finalise payment before receiving the product, paying for but not 
receiving the product, and waiting too long to receive the product (see Table 2).  
When considering reports of threats and violence from each alternative source separately (see 
Figure 1), 3.0% of participants reported threats to personal safety when obtaining drugs 
through cryptomarkets, 14.2% of participants cited threats to personal safety when obtaining 
drugs from friends, 23.6% of participants cited threats to personal safety when obtaining from 
known dealers in-person, and 35.0% of participants cited threats to personal safety when 
obtaining drugs from open public markets, including unknown dealers in the street or at 
festivals. Regarding experiencing physical violence, 1.2% reported this associated with 
obtaining drugs through cryptomarkets, 5.8% reported this occurred when obtaining drugs 
from friends, 9.8% when obtaining drugs from known dealers, and 15.0% when obtaining 
drugs from strangers.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
It may be the case that respondents who nominated an alternative source more often 
associated with violence and threats, like open markets/strangers, may also be more likely to 
report violence and threats when obtaining drugs through cryptomarkets, perhaps due to 
differences in those individuals’ propensity for violence, different drug types being traded, or 
differences in the environments. Due to the question design, it was not possible to conduct 
analyses by drug type. Instead, we compared experiences of violence and threats to safety by 
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the kind of alternative source the respondent nominated (see Figure 2). Respondents 
nominating friends as their alternative source of drugs were less likely to report threats to 
their personal safety when obtaining drugs through friends (14.2%) compared with the 
remainder of the sample who obtained from other sources (22.3%; χ2(2)= 22.87, p<.001). 
Those who would obtain drugs from known dealers were more likely to report threats to 
safety when obtaining from dealers (23.6%) compared with the remainder of the sample who 
obtained from other sources (14.8%; χ2(2)=25.01, p<.001). Respondents who would obtain 
drugs from open markets or strangers were more likely to report threats to safety in this 
context (35.0%) compared with the remainder of the sample who obtained from other sources 
(17.4%; χ2(2)=16.10, p<.001). In none of these cases were reports of threats to safety 
significantly different when obtaining drugs from cryptomarkets. Identical analyses using 
experiences of violence as an outcome variable followed a similar pattern (see Figure 2). 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Discussion 
The drug types most commonly obtained through cryptomarkets by this sample were 
MDMA/Ecstasy, cannabis and LSD. These data support previous findings published from the 
same annual survey collected two years earlier (Barratt, et al., 2014) and by more recent 
longitudinal analyses of cryptomarket feedbacks across multiple marketplaces (Soska & 
Christin, 2015). The confirmation of these data also support our argument that cryptomarkets 
are best compared with closed markets rather than open or ‘street’ markets, given that these 
drug types are most often distributed through social supply networks (Belackova & Vaccaro, 
2013; Jacinto, et al., 2008; Nicholas, 2008). We confirmed this hypothesis, finding that 
cryptomarket users report using a median of 2 additional sources to access illicit drugs in the 
last 12 months, and as predicted, these additional source were in-person friendships and in-
person known dealers (both being examples of closed markets). One quarter of the sample 
reported accessing drugs in the last 12 months from open public markets, such as ‘street’ 
dealers or buying from strangers at festivals or nightclubs.  
Cryptomarket drug buyers surveyed here overwhelmingly nominated closed networks 
(friends or known dealers) as their preferred supply source if cryptomarkets were unavailable. 
Therefore, to the extent that cryptomarket supply is used as a substitute, anticipated 
reductions in drug market violence from cryptomarket use should be measured against closed 
markets. We found that ‘threats to personal safety’ and ‘experiencing physical violence’ 
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followed a dose-response-like relationship with cryptomarkets associated with the lowest 
prevalence, then the alternative source associated with a greater prevalence as the market 
options became more open. This relationship was predictable, but some may be surprised that 
14% of participants who nominated in-person friendships as their preferred alternative source 
reported experiencing threats to their personal safety associated with this route of supply. 
Social supply may not always be ‘risk-free’ in this regard (also see Belackova & Vaccaro, 
2013), although obtaining drugs from friends certainly appeared less risky than obtaining 
drugs from either known dealers or strangers. Regardless of the alternative source they 
nominated, respondents’ experiences of drug market violence through cryptomarkets 
remained consistently low.  
Although experiences of drug market violence through the use of cryptomarkets were 
consistently low, there were other problems that were reported more regularly in association 
with cryptomarkets than with alternative drug sources. These issues included: financial losses 
due to volatile currency markets (related to the nature of cryptocurrencies); customs seizure 
of products (related to reliance on the postal delivery system across international borders); 
paying for the product prior to purchase, having to wait and in some cases never receiving the 
product (related to the distance in time and space between buyer and seller); and financial 
loss resulting from seizures of markets, scams and theft (related to the dynamic and 
ephemeral nature of the dark net environment). The extent of scams and fraud in the dark net 
environment has been well documented (Ormsby, 2014). These are examples of digital or 
online forms of violence that can occur in cryptomarkets even in the absence of the capacity 
to enforce physical injuries (see also Tzanetakis, Kamphausen, Werse & von Laufenberg, and 
Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, this volume).  
Other clusters of issues around drug impurities, law enforcement and identification-related 
concerns were reported as more prevalent when using the alternative source. It was beyond 
the scope of this paper to analyse these issues in more detail. 
Limitations 
Although this is the largest known sample of cryptomarket users available, the sample is self-
selected, and therefore, we cannot test the representativeness of this sample of the total 
population of cryptomarket drug users. The sample is also more likely to contain end-buyers 
and some retailers, rather than wholesalers. Further research would be needed to determine 
whether these findings are typical of the wider group, although the confirmation of previous 
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results through this sample lends some confidence to the findings. It should be noted that by 
virtue of those using cryptomarkets favouring anonymity, designing a representative study 
would be next to impossible. In this study, there were relatively large amounts of missing 
data. We have not attempted to use any imputation methods as this paper is not trying to 
reflect a ‘true’ population. There are other interesting questions that we were unable to 
answer with this data, including whether experiences of threats to personal safety and 
violence differed by drug type purchased, due to the question about violence not delineating 
by drug type. We are also unable to comment on changes in experiences of violence 
associated with supply-side market dynamics, nor can the results be applicable to the 
experiences of people buying drugs in lower income countries due to the sample biases of 
Global Drug Survey. While it is likely that violence and threats reported would vary by 
country, we did not run analyses by country nor did we adjust analyses for country clustering. 
Despite the large sample size, the numbers reporting violence and threats would be too small 
to model accurately by country. 
Conclusions 
Participants were less likely to report experiencing threats to personal safety or physical 
violence resulting from cryptomarket use compared with conventional drug distribution 
channels: friendships, dealers and open markets. These results are the first reported from a 
user survey that match existing claims (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014; Buxton & Bingham, 
2015; Martin, 2014; van Hout & Bingham, 2014) that this new form of drug trade can reduce 
one of the main drug market related harms. Cryptomarkets are associated with substantially 
less threats and violence than alternative market types used by cryptomarket customers, even 
though a large majority of these alternatives were closed networks where violence should be 
relatively less common. These conclusions are limited by only being applicable to drug 
market participants who access cryptomarkets: this currently being only a small proportion of 
all drug market participants. Furthermore, if the ease of cryptomarket purchase increased 
overall drug market transactions by this group (e.g., by decreasing ‘search cost’, see Kleiman, 
Caulkins, Hawken & Kilmer, 2012), or provided additional drug supply to wider drug market 
networks (see Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, this volume), net harm from switching to 
cryptomarkets may increase overall compared with conventional drug markets. Future 
research that describes and quantifies drug flows between conventional and crypto- markets 
is a next step to answering these questions. Future research could also explore the nature and 
extent of threats and experiences of different kinds of drug market related harms through in-
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depth qualitative interviews and ethnographic observation, which could inform future large-
scale survey studies.  
Soska and Christin (2015) have recently argued that intervention policies against 
cryptomarkets should be re-examined, in light of their evidence that law enforcement take-
downs of individual cryptomarkets are ineffective at reducing sales across the broad 
cryptomarket ecosystem. We agree that public policies targeting cryptomarkets should be 
reconsidered in light of our evidence that cryptomarkets are associated with less violence and 
threats than any other market type in our sample. Furthermore, our data suggest that almost 
all cryptomarkets users switch to in-person friends or dealers to access drugs when 
cryptomarkets are unavailable, suggesting that efforts to disrupt or eliminate cryptomarkets 
will displace market activity rather than deter it entirely. By displacing cryptomarket activity 
with conventional in-person drug trading, market-related harms including violence 
experienced by drug market participants will likely increase. These harms warrant 
consideration when formulating priorities for public policy around drug market disruption.  
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Figure 1: Experiencing physical violence and threats to personal safety when obtaining drugs 
through cryptomarkets, friends, dealers and strangers (%) (N=2,053) 
  
Figure(s)
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Figure 2: Experiences of physical violence and threats to personal safety grouped by type of 
alternative source (N=2,045) 
Note: ~ = p>.05, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. n=8 did not nominate friends, dealers 
or strangers as an alternative source, reducing the total n to 2,045. 
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Table 1: Drug types used for non-medical purposes and obtained through cryptomarkets (N=3,362*) 
Selected drug types Ever used Used last 12 months 
Ever obtained from 
cryptomarkets 
Proportion of ever 
users who obtained 
from cryptomarkets 
 
n % n % n % % 
Cannabis (all) 3288 97.8 3049 90.7 1443 42.9 43.9 
MDMA/Ecstasy (all) 2722 81.0 2379 70.8 1834 54.6 67.4 
NPS (all) 2100 62.5 1455 43.3 1000 29.7 47.6 
Prescription drugs (all) 2061 61.3 1613 48.0 602 17.9 29.2 
LSD 1998 59.4 1451 43.2 1169 34.8 58.5 
Cocaine 1950 58.0 1428 42.5 575 17.1 29.5 
Amphetamine (all) 1637 48.7 1109 33.0 572 17.0 34.9 
Magic Mushrooms 1956 58.2 1103 32.8 456 13.6 23.3 
Ketamine 1195 35.5 776 23.1 447 13.3 37.4 
2C drugs (all) 1138 33.9 729 21.7 598 17.8 52.5 
DMT 655 19.5 455 13.5 363 10.8 55.4 
NBOMe drugs (all) 547 16.3 317 9.4 325 9.7 59.4 
GHB/GBL 408 12.1 194 5.8 103 3.1 25.2 
Heroin 252 7.5 114 3.4 93 2.8 36.9 
 
*Note. 432 (11.4%) did not provide 1 or more drug types ever bought through cryptomarkets. These cases were excluded from the analysis for 
this table, resulting in N=3,362. 
Definition of composite variables: Cannabis (all) = cannabis skunk/hydro, cannabis herbal/normal/bush, cannabis resin/hash, cannabis oil, 
tobacco mixed with cannabis, butane hash oil. MDMA/Ecstasy (all) = MDMA powder/crystal, MDMA pills. Prescription drugs (all) = 
atomoxetine, anabolic steroids, benzodiazepines, buprenorphine, carisoprodol, cyclizine, cyclobenzaprine, dexamphetamine, gabapentin, 
methadone, modafinil, opioid pain killers, pregabalin, ritalin, tramadol, tapentadol, viagra, z-drug. Amphetamine (all) = amphetamine 
powder/paste/base, methamphetamine. 2C drugs (all) = 2C-B, 2C-C, 2C-D, 2C-E, 2C-I, 2C-T-7. NBOMe drugs (all) = 25I-NBOMe, 25C-
NBOMe, 25B-NBOMe. NPS (New Psychoactive Substances) (all) = 2C drugs (all), NBOMe drugs (all), synthetic cannabis, methylone, BZP, 
Table(s)
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ethylone, AL-LAD, Acetyl fentanyl, Alpha Methyl Trytamine (αMT), 2-AI, 5-IAI, Benzo Fury (5/6 - APB), 5/6-EAPB, C1C, 3,4-CTMP, DOC, 
DOM (STP), DOI, DPT, 2-DPMP, 4-AcO-DMT, 4-AcO-MiPT, 4-HO-DiPT, 4-HO-MET, 4-HO-MiPT, Camfetamine, D2PM, 
Dextromethorphan (powder/cough mixture), Dimethocaine, 5-EAPB, DNP, Ethylphenidate, Etizolam, 2-FA, Flephedrone (4-FMC), 
Fluoroamphetamine, 5-IT, Krokodil (desomorphine), 4-MA, MDA, MDAI, MDAT, MDPV, 4-MEC, 5-MeO-DMT, 5-MeO-DIPT (Foxy), 5-
MeO-MIPT (Moxy), Mephtetramine (MTTA), Methcathinone, Methylhexanamine (DMAA), Methylthiopropramine (MPA), Methoxetamine 
(MXE), Methoxypiperamide (MEXP), MPA, Naphyrone, N-Ethyl ketamine (N-KET / NEK / NENK), Noopept, Phenezapam, Piracetam, 
Pyrazolam, TFMPP, Tiletamine. 
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Table 2: Issues experienced when obtaining drugs from cryptomarkets and the next alternative source (N=2,053) 
 
Cryptomarkets Alternative source Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
a, b 
Inverse odds ratio  
(95% CI) 
N % N % 
Low purity product 547 26.6 1530 74.5 0.12 (0.11-0.14) 8.05 (6.99-9.28) 
Threats to personal safety 62 3.0 370 18.0 0.14 (0.11-0.19) 7.06 (5.33-9.46) 
Experiencing physical violence 25 1.2 153 7.5 0.15 (0.10-0.24) 6.53 (4.24-10.45) 
Product does not contain the expected substance 208 10.1 844 41.1 0.16 (0.14-0.19) 6.19 (5.22-7.35) 
Product unavailable 636 31.0 1492 72.7 0.17 (0.15-0.19) 5.93 (5.17-6.80) 
Variable purity product 786 38.3 1591 77.5 0.18 (0.16-0.21) 5.55 (4.83-6.38) 
Paying more than a reasonable price 765 37.3 1556 75.8 0.19 (0.17-0.22) 5.27 (4.60-6.05) 
Being caught by law enforcement 85 4.1 246 12.0 0.32 (0.24-0.41) 3.15 (2.43-4.12) 
Blackmail 28 1.4 68 3.3 0.40 (0.25-0.64) 2.48 (1.57-4.01) 
Revealing identity  61 3.0 131 6.4 0.45 (0.32-0.62) 2.23 (1.62-3.09) 
Spending money I can’t afford (overspending) 366 17.8 653 31.8 0.47 (0.40-0.54) 2.15 (1.85-2.50) 
Work/family/friends discovering drug use 275 13.4 443 21.6 0.56 (0.47-0.67) 1.78 (1.50-2.11) 
Personal health harms due to drug use 278 13.5 371 18.1 0.71 (0.60-0.85) 1.41 (1.18-1.67) 
Product stolen 177 8.6 182 8.9 0.97 (0.78-1.20) * 1.03 (0.83-1.29) * 
Waiting too long to receive the product 1044 50.9 819 39.9 1.56 (1.37-1.77) 0.64 (0.57-0.73) 
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Paying for but not receiving the product 547 26.6 333 16.2 1.88 (1.61-2.19) 0.53 (0.46-0.62) 
Loss of money due to market seizure, scam or theft 573 27.9 228 11.1 3.10 (2.61-3.68) 0.32 (0.27-0.38) 
Being asked to finalise payment before receiving product  1362 66.3 659 32.1 4.17 (3.65-4.76) 0.24 (0.21-0.27) 
Customs seizure of product 279 13.6 64 3.1 4.89 (3.68-6.57) 0.20 (0.15-0.27) 
Loss of money due to volatile currency markets 634 30.9 88 4.3 9.98 (7.88-12.74) 0.10 (0.08-0.13) 
Other 53 2.6 64 3.1 0.82 (0.56-1.21) * 1.21 (0.83-1.79) * 
None 136 6.6 75 3.7 1.87 (1.39-2.53) 0.53 (0.39-0.72) 
 
Note. N=1,741 or 45.9% did not provide a response to either question, or did not nominate an alternative source, or nominated an alternative source that they 
had never used before. These cases were excluded from the analysis for this table, resulting in N=2,053. 
a
 Odds ratios were calculating by treating the unit of event as the response for either cryptomarkets or the alternative source. We used epidemiological case 
control analysis (Stata command cci), treating cryptomarket responses as ‘cases’ and alternative source responses as ‘controls’.  
b
 Chi square tests indicated that all ORs differed significantly from 1.0 at p<.001, except for those marked * which did not reach any level of statistical 
significance (alpha = .05).  
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